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U.S.-MEXICO AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT AFTER NAFTA
BERT R. PENA* & AMY HENDERSON**
I. THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: AGRICULTURE AND
TRADE
A. Agricultural Trade
U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade has grown significantly since the mid-
1980s-from $2.3 billion in 1982 to $5.2 billion in 1991. Mexico is the
second largest supplier of agricultural products to the United States after
Canada, and the third largest export market for United States agricultural
products after Japan and the Soviet Union.'
Statistics indicate that the volume of agricultural trade between the
United States and Mexico fluctuated during the 1980s, reflecting the
evolutionary process of implementing domestic economic reform and the
vagaries of agricultural factors (such as drought) in Mexico. While the
total United States balance of trade with Mexico during the 1980s was
negative, the agricultural balance of trade has been positive. For the
decade of the 1980s, the United States enjoyed a net surplus of $3.3
billion in agricultural trade with Mexico. Mexican agricultural exports to
the United States, however, increased from about $1 billion in 1980 to
nearly $2.3 billion in 1989. Consequently, Mexican agricultural exports
to the United States experienced a more sustained pattern of gains for
the decade.
2
United States agricultural exports to Mexico registered steady increases
during the 1980s, and have especially grown in the last two years. Total
1991 United States agricultural exports to Mexico were $2.9 billion, a
nine percent increase from 1990. Mexico's population growth, its proximity
to the United States, and the availability of United States Department
of Agricluture ("USDA") short-term and intermediate-term financing for
exports have contributed to the growth in United States agriculture exports
to Mexico. Major United States export sales to Mexico in 1991 include
the following: grains ($758 million, which accounts for almost two-fifths
* Partner, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C.; Chief of Staff, Committee on Agriculture,
U.S. House of Representatives, 1988-90 and special counsel to the Committee, 1977-80; corporate
legislative counsel, Bristol-Meyers Co., (1980-88); J.D., St. Mary's College of Law, San Antonio,
Texas; admitted to the bars of Texas (1974) and Washington, D.C. (1978).
** Attorney, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C.; General Counsel & Legislative Coordinator,
Texas Office of State-Federal Relations, Washington, D.C. (1989-1990); J.D., University of Houston
Law Center; admitted to Texas bar (1989).
I. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MExrco: THE MARKET FOR U.S. FOOD AND
FARM PRODUCTS (1992).
2. U.S.-Mexico Trade: Impact of Liberalization in the Agricultural Sector, GAO/NSIAD-91-
155, at 4 (U.S. Gen. Accounting Office Mar. 1991) [hereinafter Impact of Liberalization].
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of United States exports to Mexico), meat products ($462 million), fruits
and vegetables ($437 million), hides and fats ($220 million), live animals
($141 million), and dairy products ($73 million).' High value commodity
exports have risen seventy-one percent since 1986 to $790 million, reg-
istering the highest growth rate when compared to bulk exports.4
Agricultural exports to the United States from Mexico in 1991 were
valued at $2.5 billion; exports are mainly vegetables ($894 million),
beverages (especially orange juice and beer), and specialty crops.' The
growth in exports from Mexico beginning in the 1980s has been assisted
by several factors. First, Mexico's exports have been aided by its status
under the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") program. 6 Mexico
is a major beneficiary of the GSP program, with agriculture exports of
more than $200 million in 1989.7 Second, Mexico has undertaken increased
responsiveness to export market opportunities. For example, Mexico's
horticultural export sector has expanded from 1,036,600 metric tons of
production in 1977 to 1,438,600 metric tons exported in 1990, increasing
at an average annual growth rate of 3.2076 (compared to the .8407o growth
rate for the rest of Mexico's agricultural sector).'
Finally, Mexico's food processing industry has experienced dynamic
growth. Since the 1980s, Mexico's exports in food processing have been
growing at an annual rate of twenty percent, compared to five percent
for fresh products. Processed food exports (including beverages) grew
eighty-five percent between 1982 and 1985 alone and, by 1987, their value
had exceeded all other agricultural exports. Although United States in-
vestment in Mexico's food processing industry fell seventeen percent
annually during the years 1983-1988, it rebounded by eighty-one percent
in 1989 to $466 million.9 This trend coincides with changes in Mexico's
foreign investment regulations, which now permit 100076 foreign owner-
ship. I0
B. Mexico's Agricultural Economy
Although Mexico's agricultural exports have risen, Mexico is funda-
mentally a food importer. Several factors account for Mexico's status as
a net food importer and the resulting growth of United States agricultural
3. 1991 Agricultural Trade Information (Dep't Agric. 1991).
4. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT FACT
SHEET (1992).
5. 1991 Agricultural Trade Information (Dep't Agric. 1991).
6. The GSP program promotes trade and encourages economic development in over 100 de-
veloping countries by offering duty-free entry to more than 4,000 products.
7. Impact of Liberalization, supra note 2, at 15.
8. Roberta L. Cook et al., Implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
for the U.S. Horticultural Sector, in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: EFFECTS ON
AGRICULTURE 4 (1992).
9. Laura Carlsen, Reaping Winter's Harvest, BUSINESS MEXICO, May 1991.
10. Regalmento de la Ley Para Promover la Inversion Mexicana y Regular la Inversion Extranjera
[Regulation of Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment], 427 D.O.
t, (1989).
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exports to Mexico. First, Mexico has a relative lack of arable land. Of
Mexico's almost 772,000 mile territory, only twelve percent is arable.
Mexico has 57 million arable acres (0.7 acres per person) compared to
the United States' 464 million arable acres (1.9 acres per person)."
Approximately one-fourth of the arable land is irrigated, while three-
fourths is rain-fed. The availability of water for irrigation depends greatly
on rainfall because much of Mexico's irrigation water is from surface
storage. Water resources are, however, generally scarce.12
Nonetheless, during the 1950s and early 1960s, the Mexican agricultural
economy experienced something of a "green revolution." Agricultural
productivity grew at an average annual rate of 4.507o, while the Mexican
population grew at an average annual rate of 2.9%. Agricultural in-
vestment was high and modern farming techniques were introduced. New
lands were opened and irrigation was expanded. Government-supported
research produced high-yielding crop varieties and enhanced farming tech-
nology associated with irrigated production."1
Beginning in the 1960s, however, Mexico's population growth rate has
outstripped its rate of agricultural productivity.1 4 The agricultural economy
witnessed disinvestment as resources and capital were aimed at industri-
alization and focused on the production of consumer goods pursuant to
Mexico's policy of import substitution. 5 "Roughly 400 of public spending
between 1960 and 1976 went to build Mexico's industrial plant, while
less than 14% went to agriculture. '" 16 During the 1980s, this divestiture
continued, mostly as a result of austere budgets; the government could
no longer afford to subsidize agriculture at prior levels. 17
Beginning in the 1960s, Mexico engaged in a policy of extensive gov-
ernment involvement-rather than investment-in agriculture aimed at
meeting the demographic and political imperative to increase production,
maintain the standard of living of the politically important peasant pop-
ulation, and provide adequate food supplies at non-inflationary prices to
11. AGRICULTURE IN A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: ANALYSIS OF LIBERALIZING
TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 13 (Dep't Agric. 1992) [hereinafter ArALYSIS OF
LIBERAIZIG TRADE].
12. ALAN RIDING, DISTANT NEIGHBORS: A PORTRAIT OF THE MEXICANS 189 (1985). Water flowing
from the Mississippi River alone is greater than that of all Mexico's rivers combined.
13. ANALYSIS OF LIBERALIZING TRADE, supra note 11, at 12.
14. CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS 281 (1992). From the 1960s through the 1970s, the average annual agricultural growth
rate dropped to 2.70, while the average annual population rate increased to 3.2%.
15. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects for Future
United States-Mexican Relations, Pub. No. 8732, at 4-1 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Apr. 1990).
16. Thomas E. Cox, From the U.S. To Mexico: Friendly Advice on Ending the Farm Crisis,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 12, 1990, at 18.
17. Cook et al., supra note 8. at 23. The budget for food support programs declined from $8.3
billion in 1981 to $3.1 billion in 1988. The agency that has primary government responsibility for
agricultural and livestock research (INIFAP) was reduced by 60% between 1982 and 1989. Funding
for the scientific research performed by the national agency of Science and Technology (CONACYT)
has declined by one-third over the 1980s. Furthermore, the domestic supply of modern agricultural
production inputs has decreased over the 1980s. Seed production, the agriculture equipment pool,
and the domestic consumption of fertilizer and fungicides decreased throughout the 1980s.
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its growing urban population. The primary element in Mexico's agri-
cultural policy was guaranteed prices to producers in order to stimulate
production. The government purchased basic commodities (corn, beans,
wheat, rice, sorghum, soybeans, safflower, cottonseed) at support prices
through CONASUPO (National Popular Subsistence Company), the reg-
ulatory agency for agricultural commodities. The government also sub-
sidized credit, insurance, transportation and storage, fuel, and inputs
such as fertilizer, seed, and irrigation. 8
Government purchases of commodities to maintain support for prices
were linked to an inward-looking trade policy of import licensing re-
quirements. Import licenses essentially reflect CONASUPO-determined
quotas that reflect the size of the domestic harvest and the difference
between domestic production and demand. CONASUPO also acted as
the primary importer and distributor of basic foodstuffs. It controlled
most of the milling, processing, and marketing industries and owned
numerous retail outlets. Along with price controls, these activities provided
subsidized, low-cost food for Mexican consumers.' 9
These agricultural policies were designed to promote the overall goal
of agricultural self-sufficiency and were viewed as necessary to sovereign
independence. 20 They also served the political purpose of a cheap food
policy and a de facto rural development and employment program. These
policies, however, resulted in depressed Mexican agricultural productivity
and contributed to Mexico's status as a net food importer. Price support
levels failed to provide increases in real producer prices (adjusted for
inflation) and often fell below United States and world prices,2' which
negatively affected the productivity of Mexico's agricultural sector.
In addition, while the policy of guaranteed prices encouraged a diversity
of staple crops, it discouraged production of exportable crops in which
Mexico has a comparative advantage (such as horticultural products),
thus resulting in a misallocation of agricultural resources.2 2 Finally, sub-
sidized consumer prices did not adequately curb inflation, and food prices
rose. Imports, by necessity, were increased to manage prices which con-
tributed to political stability. 2
Beginning in 1983, Mexico began the process of reforming its agri-
cultural policies as part of its overall effort to direct the economy towards
international markets, eliminate excessive regulation and state intervention
in the economy, and establish an environment to stimulate investment
and private sector participation. The Mexican government reduced guar-
anteed prices on most commodities (except for the essential staples, corn
18. Kenneth Schwedel, Will the Countryside Modernize?, BUSINESS MEXICO, July 1991.
19. U.S. International Trade Commission Publication No. 2275, at 4-5 (Apr. 1990).
20. RIDINo, supra note 12, at 194.
21. ANALYSIS OF LIBERALIZING TRADE, supra note 11, at 12.
22. EMBASSY OF MEXICO, THE MODERNIZATION OF THE MEXICAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 7-9 (1992)
(on file with the New Mexico Law Review).
23. Impact of Liberalization, supra note 2, at 23.
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and dry beans), reduced the role of and budgets for agricultural parastatals
(particularly CONASUPO), and called for privatization of others. 4
The relative inefficiency of Mexico's agricultural productivity, however,
also is deeply rooted historically in Mexico's system of land tenure. The
land system is the product of the 1910-1920 Mexican Revolution. The
revolutionary tenet of "Land and Liberty" was based on peasant frus-
tration with the accumulation of land and wealth by latifundistas (large
landholders) and the Church.25 The purpose of revolutionary agrarian
reform was to discourage the consolidation of land in the hands of the
few. Its modern by-product, however, is minifundismo (production on
very small parcels) and the accompanying inefficient scales of production,
low productivity, and low incomes.2
The primary framework for land tenure and ownership was established
in the Agrarian Reform Act of 1915 ("Ley Agraria" or "Agrarian Law")
and accorded protection in the Constitution of 1917, Article 27.27 There
are three types of land tenure: private property ("pequefios propidades"),
ejido lands, and communal lands (which are the least significant). The
Mexican Constitution gave landless peasants the right to petition for and
receive redistributed unused land ("ejido" land). "Ejidatarios" were
permitted to utilize ejido land by either working individually on their
plots within the ejido or working on the entire extension of land col-
lectively.
Ejidatarios, however, lacked ownership and the important rights that
attach. Agrarian Law essentially prohibited ejidatarios from entering into
commercial transactions regarding production, including contracts for crop
sharing, renting, or any other arrangement that would imply indirect
exploitation of the land by third parties. 2 Ejidatarios had no ability to
transfer rights in land. Agrarian Law also provided that ejido agrarian
property rights were inalienable, unencumberable, untransferable, and
therefore could not be sold, assigned, leased, or mortgaged.2 9 Any contract
entered into by individuals, or any act by a political subdivision or
judicial body resulting in the deprivation of agrarian rights pertaining to
ejidos, was null and void and could result in loss of ejidal rights for
the farmer.
24. EMBASSY OF MEXICO, THE MODERNIZATION OF THE MEXICAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 7-9.
Numerous state-owned enterprises (such as INMECAFE, AZUCAR S.A., and TABAMEX, coffee,
sugar, and tobacco parastatals) "have withdrawn from production and distribution of agricultural
products, and have been privatized or are exclusively involved in research, technical assistance and
information services." Id. FERTIMEX and PRONASE, fertilizer and seed monopolies, "are now
subject to private competition and an open border." Id. Banrural, which made agricultural loans
nationwide through 13 branch banks and hundreds of local offices has been restructured so that
farmers will be generally served by commercial banks; Banrural will focus on supporting low-income
farmers. These changes are expected to weed out inefficient farming units and to create a more
efficient, competitive, and market-driven farm sector.
25. RIDING, supra note 12, at 180.
26. EMBASSY OF MEXICO, THE MODERNIZATION OF THE MEXICAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 11.
27. MEX. CONST. art 27.
28. Id. art. 76.
29. Id. art. 52.
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In addition, Agrarian Law prohibited hiring external labor. 0 This
prohibition discouraged consolidation of production and its accompanying
efficiency. Instead, sixty percent of ejido land is farmed in five-hectare-
or-less plots by individual ejidatarios, preferring the meager security of
their plots. 3' Furthermore, seventy percent of ejidos are engaged in the
production of staple crops and do not have the means to transfer to
more profitable exportable crops. Indeed, the number of ejidos producing
beans and corn has increased since liberalization of the price support
system for other crops, diverting additional production resources to less
advantageous production and potentially neutralizing the hoped-for ben-
efits of the reform proposal.32
There are approximately 28,000 ejidos, involving more than twenty
percent of Mexico's population. Ejidos vary in size and productivity.
About twenty percent of ejidos have a good natural resource base (i.e.,
have access to irrigation or are in a beneficial growing region) and are
as productive as private farms. Twenty percent of ejidatarios are sub-
sistence farmers, who are poor but self-sufficient and would not be as
substantially affected by market liberalizations. The remaining sixty per-
cent may have a good natural resource base but, because of credit
constraints and other ejidal limitations, they are unable to maximize
productivity.3
Inefficiency in the ejido sector has important implications for Mexico's
agricultural economy. Of Mexico's total agricultural acreage, forty-eight
percent is under the jurisdiction of ejidos. There are approximately 28,000
ejidos, involving more than twenty percent of the population. Of the
total irrigated agricultural land in Mexico (over five million hectares),
half of it is under the jurisdiction of ejidos.14
In January 1992, Mexico reformed the ejido land system to permit
collateralization, rental, and potential private ownership and sale of ejido
land.3 The reformed Article 27 of the Constitution authorizes laws to
establish procedures whereby ejidatarios may associate with each other,
with the State, or with third parties. Furthermore, they may grant the
use of their lands, transfer their parcel rights between themselves, and
obtain ownership of individual parcels. 36
Specifically, ejidatarios are now authorized to rent ejido land for a
renewable term of thirty years.3 7 Moreover, they may participate in profit-
30. Id. art. 55.
31. EMBASSY OF MEXIco, Tim MODERNIZATION OF THE MExicAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 11.
32. Damian Fraser, A Second Agricultural Revolution Under Way-Land Reform, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1991, § VI.
33. Proposed Mexican Land Tenure Reforms 3 (Dep't Agric. Jan. 1992) (Report #MX1246, on
file with Foreign Agric. Service, Washington, D.C.).
34. Roberta L. Cook & Kenneth Schwedel, Mexico Frees Agricultural Investment, 10 U.S.-MEx.
FREE TRADE 1 (1991).
35. On January 6, 1992, the Federal Gazette published amendments to Constitutional Article
27, followed by publication of the new Agrarian Law on February 26, 1992.
36. MEX. CONST. art. 27, § VIII.
37. Agrarian Law, art. 45.
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sharing joint venture associations wherein private investors (foreign or
domestic) contribute capital, technology, and distribution infrastructure
while ejidatarios group together to contribute land, labor, and familiarity
with Mexican agriculture. 8
The 1992 reforms in many ways merely legitimized the extralegal rental
arrangements that had become commonplace.39 The reforms are, however,
an important political and legal step toward encouraging capitalization
in the ejido sector by injecting certainty into legal relationships with
ejidatarios. Now that contractual relations with ejidatarios have been
legitimized, contractual disputes with ejidatarios will be subject to Mexico's
commercial laws. In addition, the reformed Article 27 provides authority
for the creation of an agrarian court for adjudication of claims involving
boundary disputes, questions of land tenure and agrarian law, and es-
tablishes a National Agrarian Registry. 40 The National Agrarian Registry
is an agency of the Secretariat of Agrarian Reform and is responsible
for recording documents relating to land ownership and the ejidal rights
created in reformed Article 27.41
Significantly, the 1992 reform also formally ends the revolutionary
Constitution's land distribution agrarian reform. 42 This has important
implications for private landholders; the threat of private property ex-
propriation has in many instances prevented private land owners from
making permanent improvements on their property and from entering
into long-term investment ventures. 43 The 1992 reforms prohibit latifun-
dista landholding by affirming the limitations placed on ownership of
private property, thus more securely defining private property rights.
Private landholdings are subject to limitations of 100 hectares (247 acres)
of irrigated land for row crops, 300 hectares (720 acres) of irrigated land
for orchards, and enough land to run 500 head of livestock."
Finally, the 1992 reforms addressed the Article 27 prohibition on
corporate farming, which was one of the most significant restrictions on
Mexican agricultural productivity. Previously, Article 27 permitted only
38. Agrarian Law, ch. 11.
39. The "Vaquerias project" is the prototype for ejidal joint ventures: In 1990, PepsiCo acquired
Mexican cookie-maker Gamesa for $320 million in 1990 and formed a $12 million profit-sharing
joint venture with ejidal farmers to grow beans, wheat, and corn in Nuevo Leon, in exchange for
equipment and training. The Administrations of Portillo (1976-1982) and De la Madrid (1982-1988)
rejected the Gamesa proposal, but the Salinas Administration extended political support. The project,
however, potentially violated the Constitution's ejidal provisions; therefore, Gamesa and the ejidatarios
established a separate company (Dicamex) to oversee the project. Constitutionality questions persisted
but are now fully settled by the present reforms.
40. MEX. CoNsT. art. 27, § XIX. Agrarian Reform Law establishes the Office of Attorney
General for Agrarian Affairs, which is charged with defending the rights of ejido members, communal
farm members, small land holders, ejido residents, and agricultural workers. Agrarian Law, tit. 7.
Prior to the creation of this agrarian judicial forum, ejidal property disputes were handled admin-
istratively by the Secretariat of Agrarian Reform (SRA).
41. Parties to agreements formed with ejidatarios before Article 27 reform must register these
pre-existing agreements with the National Agrarian Registry to make them presently enforceable.
42. Agragarian Law, tit. X (repealed 1992).
43. EMBASSY OF MExico, TiHE MODERNIZATION OF THE MEXICAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 11.
44. MEX. CoNsT. art. 27, § XV.
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individuals (personas fisicas) to own the means of agricultural production.
The 1992 reforms permit stock-issuing corporations to farm (including
foreign corporations, subject to certain limitations) up to a maximum
landholding limit of 2,500 hectares (twenty-five times that of an individual
landholder) ."
Title 6 of the reformed Agrarian Law provides that a corporation
which owns agricultural land must issue capital stock, called "Series T"
stock, which represents the market value of the land at the time of
purchase.4 At least as many individuals as the number of times the lands
of the corporation exceed the small individual property limits shall par-
ticipate in the corporation or partnership.47 At the same time, the par-
ticipation of an individual in landholding corporations is cumulative; an
individual may not have equity participation in more than the individual
property limits when all investments are considered. Likewise, no cor-
poration may hold more shares or corporate interest of Series T stock,
either from one or several issuing corporations, than the equivalent of
2,500 hectares (twenty-five times the individual limit).48 Foreign investors
may own up to forty-nine percent of Series T stock. 49
C. Existing Barriers to Agricultural Trade Between the United States
and Mexico
Tariffs are the main agricultural import barrier utilized by the United
States. While United States import duties on agricultural products are
relatively low, the United States maintains higher seasonal tariffs on fruit
and vegetables to limit imports from Mexico during the main marketing
period for United States produce. United States tariffs on horticultural
products and orange juice imports range from zero to thirty-five percent
ad valorem.
The United States imposes quantitative restrictions on various agri-
cultural imports pursuant to Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933,0 including sugar and sugar-containing products, cotton,
peanuts, and dairy products. Section 22 authorizes quotas or fees on
imported products whenever they undermine or interfere with United
States domestic commodity programs, notwithstanding any trade or other
international agreement. 5'
Mexico's unilateral trade liberalizations pursuant to its 1986 GATT
membership have resulted in a reduced share of United States agricultural
exports subject to Mexico's import licensing requirements and reduced
minimum tariff rates. In 1991, licensing requirements on agricultural
45. Id. art. 27, § IV.
46. Agrarian Law, tit. 6, art. 126(111).
47. Id. tit. 6, art. 126(I).
48. Id. art. 129.
49. Id. art. 130.
50. 7 U.S.C. §§ 624 (1980).
51. The United States has received a GATT waiver that exempts Section 22 from compliance
with GATT rules.
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products remained on twenty-six percent of United States exports (the
top ten United States agricultural exports), down from fifty-seven percent
in 1988.52 The 1990 tariff equivalents of the import licenses for corn and
wheat, however, were estimated to be seventy-three percent and fifty
percent, respectively-a considerable trade barrier.53
About forty percent of the imports from Mexico enter free of duty,
and the remainder are dutiable at a trade-weighted average rate of about
seven percent ad valorum. Mexico's trade-weighted tariff on United States
agricultural products averages about eleven percent.5 4 As Mexico has
eliminated licensing requirements, however, it has raised tariffs in response
to market disruptions in some cases.55
Both Mexico and the United States apply phytosanitary requirements
(measures to protect animals and plants from diseases and pests) to
domestic and imported products. Some Mexican fruit crops and livestock
have faced restricted access to the United States because their history of
pest infestation posed a threat to United States production. 6 Mexico
would like more aggressive United States action in responding to im-
provements in Mexican production conditions and faster market access
for Mexican products that no longer pose a threat.
Mexican horticultural producers argue that United States marketing
orders impede trade because Mexican producers often do not receive
adequate notice of changes in United States grade or standard require-
ments.57 Marketing orders, established under the Agriculture Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937,19 set national guidelines for product quality,
market promotion, and supply levels. The most significant items for
Mexico affected by marketing orders include tomatoes, onions, avocados,
grapefruit, oranges, olives, and table grapes.
Mexico similarly has plant and animal health regulations and certificate
requirements that affect imports of American products and livestock.
52. "As of January 1991, licenses were required for a small number of commodities: corn for
food use, wheat, poultry, eggs, nonfat dry milk, some cheeses, day-old chicks, potatoes, grapes,
apples, peaches, coffee, barley, malt, lard, flue-cured tobacco and cigars." MARY E. BURFISHER ET
AL., TRADE IMPACTS ON THE U.S. AND SouTiERN AGIUCuLTauR 4 (1992).
53. Id.
54. The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico, Pub. No.
2353, at 4-3 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Feb. 1991) (report to the Committee on Ways and Means
of the United States House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the United States
Senate on Investigation No. 332-297 Under Section 332 of the Tariff Act).
55. BURFISHER ET AL., supra note 52, at 4.
56. Mexican avocadoes are completely banned from the United States due to seed weevil in-
festation. Mexican orchard crops have faced restricted access to the United States due to citrus
canker and the prevalence of the Mediterranean and Mexican fruit flies in some growing areas.
Feeder cattle imported from Mexico must be accompanied by a health certificate from a Mexican
government veterinarian. Most other live animal imports from Mexico are banned because they
allegedly carry diseases which do not exist in the United States. Live Mexican swine have been
prohibited since 1976 due to hog cholera infection. Mexican poultry have been prohibited due to
Exotic New-Castle disease, and Mexican sheep and goats have been prohibited because of scrapies.
U.S.-Mexico Trade: Trends and Impediments in Agricultural Trade, GAO/NSIAD-90-85BR, at 15-
16 (U.S. Gen. Accounting Office Jan. 1990) [hereinafter Trends and Impediments).
57. U.S. International Trade Commission Publication No. 2275, at 2-3 (Apr. 1990).
58. 6 U.S.C.A. § 608e-1 (1980).
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United States exporters usually have little difficulty meeting Mexico's
requirements. Unexpected changes in the requirements and lengthy ad-
ministrative procedures, however, have produced problems for United
States exporters in the past.59 For example, in December 1991, Mexico
temporarily closed its border to the importation of hogs from the United
States for animal health reasons. United States agricultural policy-makers
termed the action unjustified and called for an effective health and
phytosanitary dispute mechanism in the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA").W0
Finally, limited border processing facilities also present barriers to trade.
Agricultural trade competes with commercial trade for border adminis-
trative and infrastructure resources, which can result in agricultural losses
due to perishability. Inadequate rail, highway, and port facilities, and
lack of adequate storage and warehousing, also act as barriers to trade
and as limitations to potential growth in agricultural trade. 6'
II. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND
AGRICULTURE
A. Provisions of NAFTA Affecting Agriculture
1. Scope
Mexico negotiated separate agricultural market access agreements with
the United States and Canada. The United States and Mexico have agreed
to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers in agriculture over a fifteen-
year transition period. The U.S.-Mexico agricultural agreement is com-
prehensive. There are no exclusions. 62
The NAFTA agricultural provisions contain trilateral provisions con-
cerning internal supports, export subsidies, and dispute resolution. Trade
restrictions applied by the three NAFTA countries to imports from all
other countries will remain unchanged, unless modified by a subsequent
GATT agreement.
2. Elimination of Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers
Non-tariff barriers (most notably Mexico's import licensing requirements
and United States Section 22 import quotas) will be converted into tariffs
59. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects for Future
United States-Mexican Relations, Pub. No. 2326, at 2-4 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Oct. 1990) (Phase
II: Summary of Views on Prospects for Future United States-Mexico Relations).
60. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Mex.-Can., art. 707
ihereinafter NAFTA].
61. Trends and Impediments, supra note 56, at 17.
62. Mexico and Canada reached a similar separate agreement on agricultural market access.
NAFTA, supra note 60, annex. 704.2, § 2. Nonetheless, tariffs and non-tariff barriers between
Mexico and Canada affecting trade in dairy, poultry, and eggs will be maintained. These exceptions
are the product of Canada's political sensitivity to liberalization of these production-controlled
products. Tariffs on sugar also will be maintained. Agricultural trade between the United States
and Canada will continue to be governed by the 1989 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
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("tariffication"). All agricultural tariffs will be phased out within fifteen
years, according to the following transition schedule:6"
Transition Category A: Immediate tariff elimination, effective January
1, 1994. Products in this category comprise almost half of current U.S.-
Mexico agricultural trade. They either are already duty-free or subject
to very low tariffs. About $1.6 billion in Mexican exports, and about
$1.5 billion in U.S. exports to Mexico, will fall into this tariff-free
category." The United States will eliminate immediately sixty-one percent
of its tariffs on agricultural exports from Mexico; Mexico will eliminate
thirty-six percent of its tariffs on United States agricultural exports. In
addition, the United States will eliminate tariffs on some items during
months in which Mexican-produced products do not compete with the
same products grown in the United States.65
Transition Category B: Five-year transition. Products in this category
include items not highly sensitive but which require a market adjustment
period. Generally, tariffs will be phased out in equal annual increments.
The United States wil place approximately $177 million of Mexican
imports in this category, six percent of Mexico's agricultural exports.
Mexico will include about $131 million in United States products, ap-
proximately three percent of United States agricultural exports.6
Transition Category C: Ten-year transition. These items are considered
trade-sensitive. They are subject to annual incremental tariff reductions.
The United States placed about $375 million of Mexican exports in this
category and Mexico included about $875 million of United States ex-
ports .67
Transition Category C+: Fifteen-year transition. A fifteen-year tariff
phase-out, taken in equal annual increments, is applied to products
considered very sensitive. Mexico has no items in this category. The
United States placed mainly selected fruits, citrus, and vegetables in the
category, accounting for about $75 million in exports from Mexico.6
Transition Category C & Tariff Rate Quota Protection: Fifteen-year
transition with safeguard. A special set of rules based on a tariff rate
quota ("TRQ") mechanism have been devised to safeguard highly import-
sensitive items. The TRQ will be applied over either a ten- or fifteen-
year transition period, depending on the sensitivity of the item. There
are two basic types of TRQs, which have been further modified for
sugar, frozen concentrate orange juice, and regular orange juice. 69 The
first type of TRQ is formulated for commodities with existing non-tariff
63. NAFTA, supra note 60, annex 302.2.
64. Report of the Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee for Trade (APAC) On the North
American Free Trade Agreement 4 (Sept. 1992).
65. The products include cucumbers, eggplants, asparagus, melons, strawberries, cherry tomatoes,
peas, and watermelons. NAFTA, supra note 60, annex 703.2.
66. Report of APAC, supra note 64, at 4.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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barriers, such as Section 22 commodities70 and commodities under Mex-
ico's licensing requirements." This TRQ is based on a duty-free quota
which increases over the transition period. The over-quota tariff, which
is established in NAFTA and reflects the current value of the non-tariff
barrier, is phased out to zero over the ten- or fifteen-year transition
period.
The second type of TRQ protection contained in the tariff schedule
is formulated for commodities with existing tariffs. 72 For this TRQ, the
quota amount reflects the present level of trade and will grow annually,
generally at three percent. The amounts imported within the increasing
quota amount will be subject to preferential NAFTA tariff rates, which
will be phased out over the transition period. Amounts imported over-
quota will be subject to the prevailing tariff at the time the agreement
is signed or to the most favored nation rate, whichever is lower. The
protective over-quota tariff is not phased down over the transition, but
becomes zero at the end of the transition period. Within the ten-year
transition Category C, the United States placed under TRQ protection
about $330 million of Mexican exports, equaling fifteen percent of Mex-
ico's agricultural exports to the United States. 3 Mexico requested inclusion
of seventeen items exported by the United States, valued at $100 million. 74
The United States and Mexico included their most trade-sensitive items
under Category C+ TRQ protection. Mexico included corn, dry beans,
and milk powder, 75 representing approximately $208 million in United
States exports. 76 Most notably, the negotiated market access for United
States corn exports is 2.5 million metric tons in the first year of im-
plementation; the over-quota tariff equals 215%, and will be reduced
twenty-four percent in the first six years, then reduced to zero in the
following nine years. The United States included about $45 million in
imports from Mexico in this protective category, 77 including sugar, pea-
nuts, frozen concentrate orange juice ("FCOJ"), and orange juice not
concentrated.
Additional special rules were negotiated for sugar and FCOJ. The quota
amount of FCOJ entering the United States from Mexico-40 million
gallons at fifty percent of the current most favored nation ("MFN")
tariff-will not be increased over the fifteen-year transition period. The
over-quota tariff on FCOJ will decline fifteen percent over the first six
70. Id. at 5. These include dairy, peanut, cotton, and sugar and sugar-containing products. See
NAFTA, supra note 60, annex 302.2, § A (Schedule of the United States; Tariffication Parameters).
71. Report of APAC, supra note 64, at 5. These include most notably corn, poultry, dried
beans, potatoes, eggs, barley, malt, animal fats, and milk powder. See NAFTA, supra note 61,
annex 302.2 § B (Schedule of Mexico; Tariffication Parameters).
72. Report of APAC, supra note 64, at 5.
73. Id. These exports consist mainly of fruits and vegetables.
74. Id. These items consist mainly of pork, potatoes, and apples.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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years, stay constant from year seven to year ten, and then will be phased
out in equal installments over the remaining five years.
71
Sugar from Mexico imported under the existing quota (7,258 metric
tons) will immediately become duty-free and the sixteen-cent over-quota
tariff will be reduced by fifteen percent during the first six years. If
Mexico is projected to become a net exporter of sugar (i.e., producing
more sugar than it consumes domestically), the United States will increase
Mexico's share of the overall quota to the amount during years one
through six, up to a maximum of 25,000 metric tons. In year seven, the
United States will begin reducing the above-quota tariff on a straight
line to zero over the next eight years. If Mexico is projected to be a
net exporter, the United States will increase its quota to the amount by
which it is a net exporter up to 150,000 metric tons. This 150,000 ton
limit will be increased by ten percent each year and will be waived
permanently if Mexico is a net exporter for two consecutive years. Mexico
will align its tariff regime with that of the United States by the end of
year six, implementing a tariff quota with rates equal to those of the
United States. The United States sugar re-export program will remain in
place between the United States and Mexico, permitting duty-free access
where one party imports raw sugar from the other, refines it, and then
re-exports it back to the producing country.7 9
3. Safeguards
The Emergency Action provisions0 apply to all commodities which do
not have specific tariff-rate quotas to protect against import surges during
tariff phase-out. The Chapter 8 emergency action safeguard suspends
further tariff reductions and re-establishes a rate not less than the MFN
rate. An injured party is required to provide a written request for a
proceeding to initiate emergency action; emergency action must take place
within a year of the proceeding.81 Generally, the action may be maintained
for a maximum of three years and no actions may be brought after the
transition period.8 2 The safeguard may be used against a particular good
only once during the transition period. 3
4. Subsidies
NAFTA parties may utilize export subsidies against competition from
non-NAFTA countries. NAFTA parties may introduce an export subsidy
on exports of an agricultural good to another NAFTA country following
three days' notice and consultations with that country. Each party main-
tains its right to apply countervailing duties to subsidized agricultural
78. NAFTA, supra note 60, annex 302.2, § C (Schedule of the United States; U.S. Orange Juice
Tariff Reduction Schedule).
79. Id. annex 703.2. § A.
80. Id. ch. 8.
81. Id. art. 801, 2 (Bilateral Actions).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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imports from any source, including NAFTA parties, A trilateral NAFTA
Working Group on Agricultural Subsidies is established to meet at least
semi-annually to review subsidy issues,84 While no changes in domestic
agricultural subsidies are required of any of the NAFTA countries, the
Agreement does require participants to endeavor to move toward domestic
policies that have "minimum or no trade distorting or production ef-
fects.' '85
5. Rules of Origin86
Rules of origin are intended to prevent non-NAFTA countries from
benefiting from the preferential tariff treatment afforded by NAFTA.
United States agricultural interests are particularly concerned that Mexico
would he used as an export platform fo products from other
particularly through Mexico's growing food processing industry. Generally,
the agricultural rules of origin provisions utilize the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement de minimis rule, which allows products to receive
NAFTA tariff treatment as long as foreign ingredients make up less than
seven percent of the value of the commodity. 87 Note, however, that all
bulk agricultural commodities and certain processed products-including
orange juice, cheese, and peanut products-are exempt from the de
minimis provisions and 10Oo NAFTA origin is required. Furthermore,
processing of certain products (e.g., vegetable oils, sugar) will not be
sufficient to confer NAFTA origin. The rules of origin are permanent
and are not given a transition status.
6. Marketing Orders
United States marketing orders on fruits and vegetables are maintained
in NAFTA. The Agreement provides that, as between the United States
and Mexico, no less favorable treatment will be given to agricultural
imports than is provided for domestic agricultural products with regard
to classification, grading, or marketing provisions.88 A U.S.-Mexico Work-
ing Group will meet at least once a year to review the operation of
grade and quality standards and to resolve issues which may arise.8 9
7. Health and Sanitary Standards9°
Each NAFTA country preserves its right to establish sanitary and
phytosanitary measures based on risk assessment and scientific principles
which may be higher than international standards. Measures may be
applied only to the extent necessary to provide a country's chosen level
84. Id. art. 705, 6 (Export Subsidies).
85. Id. art. 704 (Domestic Support).
86. Id. ch. 4.
87. Id. art. 405, 1 1-2 (De Minimis).
88. Id. annex 703.2, § A, pt, 23.
89. Id. annex 703.2, § A, pt. 25. Mexico and Canada will have a similar working group. Id.
annex 702.3, § B, pt. 13.
90. Id. ch. 7, § B.
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of protection and may not result in unfair discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade. 9'
The Agreement requires that parties provide adequate information on
proposed phytosanitary measures. State and local governments, which
may maintain scientifically-based health and sanitary regulations, must
do the same. 92 Without reducing the level of protection for human,
animal, or plant life, NAFTA parties must pursue equivalence of their
respective sanitary and phytosanitary measures, using international stan-
dards as a basis for their sanitary and phytosanitary standards to the
greatest extent practicable. 93
The agreement outlines requirements regarding a party's sanitary and
phytosanitary control and procedures for inspection and import approval.
Generally, a party must provide another NAFTA party adequate infor-
mation and advance notice of the procedure, and the Agreement establishes
guidelines to ensure procedures are fair and expeditious. 94 A Committee
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures is established to facilitate stan-
dard equivalence and technical cooperation between the parties. 9" The
Committee is authorized to consider disputes regarding a party's sanitary
or phytosanitary measures that may be disguised trade barriers. 96
8. Commercial Dispute Resolution 97
A trilateral advisory committee (the North American Free Trade Com-
mission) is established to supervise implementation of the Agreement and
to oversee dispute resolution. It will be made up of the principal trade
officers of each of the three countries. 9 Generally, parties may resort
to either the GATT or the NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism; how-
ever, once a forum is chosen it must be used to the exclusion of the
other. 99
When a dispute arises, the complaining party initiates consultations.
Consultations on matters regarding perishable agricultural goods must
commence within fifteen days of the request for consultations. 10 If within
thirty days the dispute has not been settled between the parties, a meeting
of the Commission may be called wherein it mediates and makes re-
commendations regarding resolution. 01 If within thirty days the Com-
mission has not settled the dispute, a complaining party may request an
arbitration panel.10 2 Whenever possible, the resolution contained in the
91. Id. art. 712.
92. Id. art. 718.
93. Id. art. 714.
94. Id. art. 717.
95. Id. art. 722.
96. Id. art. 723.
97. Id. ch. 20.
98. Id. art. 2001.
99. Id. art. 2005 (GATT Dispute Settlement).
100. Id. art. 2006 (Consultations).
101. Id. art. 2007 (Commission Good Offices, Conciliation, and Mediation).
102. Id. art. 2008 (Request for an Arbitral Panel).
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panel's report shall be non-implementation or nullification of a measure
not conforming with the Agreement; failing such a resolution, compen-
sation is available. 0 3
The Agreement provides for alternative commercial dispute resolution
and establishes an Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes.'0
The Committee will work toward a system for resolving private commercial
disputes that arise in connection with transactions in agricultural goods,
with special emphasis on perishability of the goods involved. 0 5 In addition,
the Agreement establishes a trilateral Committee on Agricultural Trade
to monitor and consult upon the implementation of provisions in Sub-
chapter 7 (agriculture) pertaining to market access."'6
B. Effect of NAFTA on Agriculture in the United Statec and Mexico
With certain significant exceptions, United States agriculture will benefit
from NAFTA. By the end of the fifteen-year transition, annual United
States agricultural exports likely will be $1.5 to $2.0 billion higher than
they would be without NAFTA. In addition, United States gains will
come without need for production adjustments or efficiency enhance-
ment.0 7 The United States Department of Agriculture estimates that if
recent levels of protection are removed, United States agriculture exports
to Mexico would increase by one-third, while Mexico's agricultural exports
to the United States would expand one-fifth by the end of the imple-
mentation period. 08 Thus, trade in agriculture tends to favor the United
States. The full benefits of expanded agricultural exports, however, are
premised on Mexico's continued economic development and increased
disposable income resulting from NAFTA.
The benefits of free trade in the grain and bulk commodities sector
flow almost entirely to the United States. Immediate tariff-free access
for 2.5 million metric tons of corn and Mexico's commitment to achieve
free trade in this highly sensitive commodity is extremely beneficial to
United States grain producers and also gives United States products an
important advantage over other competitive grain exporting countries,
except Canada. At the end of the fifteen-year transition period, United
States exports of corn to Mexico will likely be about six million metric
tons. This is almost fifteen percent above the level which would occur
without NAFTA. United States producers of wheat, barley, and sorghum
will benefit to a lesser degree.' 9
103. Id. art. 2018 (Implementation of Final Report).
104. Id. art. 707 (Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes Regarding Agricultural
Goods).
105. Id.
106. Id. art. 706 (Committee on Agricultural Trade).
107. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
FACT SHEET (1992).
108. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURE IN THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
ANALYSIS OF LIBERALIZING TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MExicO 13 (1992).
109. OFFICE OF ECONOMICS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ON U.S. AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 2-3 (1992).
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In addition, United States exports of high value foods (i.e., meat and
poultry products, dairy products and snack foods) are expected to increase.
These projections are based on expected expansion of Mexico's developing
middle class. Because the United States already has a major share of
the Mexican market, further increases in United States sales depend on
the growing size of this group. Increased incomes in Mexico will result
in enhanced consumer tastes for a diversity of value-added products,
which previously would have been subject to higher tariffs."0
Liberalization of Mexico's grain sector has the potential for substantially
reducing corn prices in Mexico, which historically has held its domestic
corn prices seventy percent above world prices (allowing for transport
costs and quality differefitial) through import controls."' A recent study
at the University of Pennsylvania Center for Energy and the Environment
indicates that "[wihen prices decrease, the [smaller] farmers' income drops
at a rate 2001o faster because of the farmers' decreased ability to finance
production."" 2 Furthermore, liberalization pits prodigious United States
corn and grain producers against their less efficient Mexican counterparts,
whose costs of production are markedly higher and who do not have
the benefit of domestic subsidy programs.
As a result, Mexico potentially faces substantial rural worker displace-
ment over the transition to liberalized agriculture markets and production,
which has important implications for illegal immigration in the United
States. Up to 700,000 workers are predicted to be displaced by agriculture
modernization. This implies a migration of between one and five million
people, given the average rural family size."' Mexico's essential task will
be to create enough industrial jobs to absorb dislocated rural workers
while also modernizing its agricultural sector with adequate infrastructure
and technology and encouraging transition from staple to exportable
crops. NAFTA is expected to assist this effort by lowering trade barriers
for United States farm machinery, pesticides, fertilizers, and other supplies
and by encouraging capital flows to Mexico, both in agriculture and
throughout the economy." 4
Trade in the horticultural sector is strongly in Mexico's favor. Elim-
ination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers is expected to generate significant
increases in United States imports of horticultural products from Mexico.
This is primarily due to cost advantages Mexican producers have relative
to United States growers and processors." 5 These cost advantages stem
from lower labor costs, and from fewer environmental regulations and
110. FOREIGN AGRIC. SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AORIC., MEXIco: THE MARKET FOR U.S. FOOD AND
FARm PRODUCTS 2 (1992).
111. Santiago Levy & Sweder van Wijnbergen, Transition Problems in Economic Reform: Ag-
riculture in the Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 2 n.1 (Dec. 1991) (unpublished World Bank
report; on file with New Mexico Law Review).
112. Mark Bernstein & Daniel Haling, Mexico Farmers Must Own Land to Compete, HOUSTON
CRRONICLE, Feb. 21, 1992, at Bll.
113. Levy & Wijnbergen, supra note 111, at 24.
114. Ronald Schmidt & William Gruben, Ejido Reform and the NAFTA, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF SAN FRANCISCO WKLY LETTER, Oct. 2, 1992, at 2.
115. U.S. International Trade Commission Publication 2353, supra note 54, at 4-3.
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worker safety protection laws than United States growers and processors
face. 6
Some of Mexico's horticultural production is complementary to United
States production." 7 United States producers of citrus and winter fruits
and vegetables, however, are in direct competition with their Mexican
counterparts. United States producers of these products indicate that
NAFTA's transition provisions do not afford adequate protection from
economic injury. For example, Florida citrus producers argue that the
fifteen-year transition period for tariff elimination will not allow them
to recoup their substantial investment in rebuilding Florida's citrus industry
in the wake of freezes in the 1980s. Over 400,000 acres of citrus have
been replanted since 1988. Florida citrus growers estimate that, without
ensuing price deterioration due to tariff reductions or without any natural
adversities, it would take a Florida grower who financed planting sixteen
to seventeen years to recover investment and twenty to twenty-one years
to make a ten percent return on investment." 8 These producers oppose
NAFTA's immediate fifty percent reduction in tariffs for current import
levels of frozen concentrate orange juice imports, and urge maintaining
current tariffs for twenty years."19
United States winter vegetable producers will face increased Mexican
exports of cucumbers, bell peppers, fresh and frozen broccoli, fresh
tomatoes, fresh asparagus, and melons. These producers argue that the
fifteen year phase-out for import-sensitive vegetables should be expanded
to twenty years.' 2 0 In addition, Florida vegetable growers would like to
see the category for import-sensitive vegetables expanded to include more
items.' 2' Finally, United States fruit and vegetable producers recommend
modifying the tariff rate quota safeguard to account for decreases in
prices, rather than just for increases in imports, in triggering higher
protective tariffs.1 22
116. Florida workers can earn more in one hour than Mexican workers do in an entire
day, In addition, Mexican producers are not saddled with other labor benefits such
as high Minimum Wage laws, Social Security, Workers' Compensation, unemploy-
ment insurance, and in many cases, health insurance. Additionally, there is con-
siderable cost of compliance to U.S. producers caused by the Migrant & Seasonal
Farm Worker Protection Act, Housing and Field Sanitation regulations, the Oc-
cupational Safety & Health Act, Child Labor laws, the 1986 Immigration Reform
and Control Act, Motor Carrier Safety laws, the Hazardous Communications Act
and various state and federal discrimination and Human Rights Acts.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means (1990) (written
statement of Frank Bouis, President, The Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association).
117. See U.S.-Mexico Trade: The Extent to Which Mexican Horticultural Exports Complement
U.S. Production, GAO/NSIAD-91-94BR, (U.S. Gen. Accounting Office Mar. 1991).
118. David B. Land, Statement Before the House Committee on Agriculture 2 (Sept. 23, 1992)
(transcript on file with New Mexico Law Review).
119. Ron Hamel, Statement Before the House Committee on Agriculture (Sept. 23, 1992) (transcript
on file with New Mexico Law Review).
120. Jack Pope, Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected Industries of the North
American Free Trade Agreement 3 (Nov. 9, 1992) (statement on behalf of the Western Growers
Association to the International Trade Commission; on file with New Mexico Law Review).
121. Land, supra note 118, at 6.
122. Jodean Bens, Statement on Behalf of the United Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Ass'n Before
the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 3 (Nov. 17-19, 1992) (transcript on file with New Mexico Law Review).
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The United States will benefit from the agreement in certain horticultural
products. These products include non-citrus fruit and certain vegetables
(notably potatoes), which often do not grow as well in Mexico's climate
or are currently subject to high import barriers. United States fresh peach,
apple, and pear exports to Mexico are expected to double by the end
of the transition period.1 21
The ultimate impact of free trade on the import-sensitive sector of the
United States horticultural industry will depend on a number of factors.
The first of these factors is Mexico's ability to expand horticultural
production as it scales back production of bulk commodities. Progress
will be based to a large degree upon responsiveness to recent constitutional
reforms. In the immediate term, the ejido reforms may have only limited
effect on land rentals since ejidatarios in many areas have been renting
their land for several years. In the medium term, however, more ejidatarios
will view their land as an income-generating asset and will augment their
income by renting their land and taking off-farm employment. The market
for land could be flooded with offers, thus driving down rents to attractive
levels. In addition, there likely will be some increase in the size of land
holdings among small landowners.'14 Historically, individuals have suc-
cessfully circumvented individual property limitations through partnerships
and family holding arrangements. Limitations, however, now may be
more rigorously enforced. 2
Another factor to consider in Mexico's agricultural modernization is
the extent to which infrastructure will be enhanced. NAFTA promotes
Mexican railroad reform by permitting United States companies to own
and operate terminals and other facilities as well as to finance the building
and upgrading of tracks and the construction of spur lines. 2 6 Also,
NAFTA will permit United States trucking companies to obtain operating
authority from the Mexican government for carriage of international
cargo in Mexico. The Agreement provides for transportation access to
Mexican border states within three years of implementation, and to all
states within six years.' 27 Increased efficiency and decreased congestion,
especially at the border, is expected.
Mexico is also engaged in privatization and capitalization of its ports.
The privatization will take the form of granting concessions to allow
private companies to own and operate warehouses and docks, or of
permitting long-term leasing of terminals and other facilities. Puertos
Mexicanos (a division of the Communications and Transportation Ministry
responsible for port planning, maintenance, and construction) reports
123. OFFICE OF ECONOMICS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ON U.S. AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 14 (1992).
124. Proposed Mexican Land Tenure Reforms 6-7 (Dep't Agric. Jan. 1992) (Report #MX1246,
on file with Foreign Agric. Service, Washington, D.C.).
125. Roberta L. Cook & Kenneth Schwedel, Mexico Frees Agricultural Investment, 10 U.S.-MEx.
FREE TRADE 2 (1991).
126. NAFTA, supra note 60, annex II (Schedule of Mexico).
127. Id.
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more than thirty-four bids for private investment. Investment is already
underway at the Gulf port of Vera Cruz and the Baja port of Ensefiada.128
United States sugar producers are concerned about the impact of
NAFTA, particularly Mexico's potential ability to ship its total exportable
surplus of sugar to the United States duty-free in year seven of the
fifteen-year tariff phase-out. This would require Mexico to become a net
exporter of sugar, which may be possible if Mexico converts its soft
drink industry to high fructose corn syrup ("HFCS"), as the United
States soft drink industry did in the 1980s. This would potentially free
up at least one half million tons of sugar for export to the United States.
Under a possible NAFTA scenario envisioned by a recent USDA study,
Mexico's annual sugar production could increase to 5.2 million tons by
1996, while domestic consumption could fall below four mi.lon tons per
year (due to use of HFCS in soft drinks). A surplus of 1.2 million metric
tons could result by 1996, which nearly equals the entire 1.23 million
ton United States sugar import quota for all sugar exporting countries. 29
Such a level of trade would have a substantial impact on the United
States sugar program and possibly could require a reduction of imports
from other sugar suppliers (such as Caribbean countries). These countries
voiced their concern in this regard throughout NAFTA negotiations. 30
The United States sugar industry is requesting several modifications of
the negotiated agreement, particularly inclusion of HFCS in consumption
calculations for determining "net exporter" status.1 31 Mexico rejected this
suggestion during NAFTA negotiations and the United States was un-
willing to offer concessions in other areas to change Mexico's position.'32
United States dairy, cotton, and peanut producers have raised com-
petitive concerns regarding NAFTA; however, their main objection to
the Agreement is the erosion of Section 22 authorities. Some agricultural
policy-makers have argued that Section 22 issues instead should be ne-
gotiated in the context of GATT.'33 Given the NAFTA tariffication of
128. J. COMMERCE, Dec. 2, 1991, at lB.
129. According to a recent study published by Cleveland Consulting Associations, 87vo of 190
executives (representing 170 companies) indicated that their countries are already doing business in
Mexico. Of these 170 companies, 58 are food-processing companies and 38 are Fortune 500 companies.
The study found that 85076 of the respondents cited access to the 81 million-person Mexican consumer
market as the greatest benefit of free trade with Mexico, while only 130 listed operating efficiencies
as their top priority. Charles Morris, Americanada: Its Impact on Food, FOOD ENGINEERING, July
1992, at 65.
130. ECON, RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGoic., LATIN AMERICA'S BiG THREE SUGAR PRODUCERS
IN TRANSITION: CUBA, MEXICO, BRAZIL 20 (1992).
131. Letter from CBI Sugar Group to the Honorable Joe O'Mara, Deputy Undersecretary of
Agriculture (July 13, 1992).
132. Other modifications sought by the sugar industry include: 1) calculating "surplus producer"
on the basis of verifiable history instead of projection, as currently provided; 2) incorporating U.S.
market access limitation; and 3) extending ten-year tariff phaseout for refined sugar and sugar
containing products to fifteen-year transition. Thomas A. Hammer, Report of the Agricultural
Technical Advisory Committee for Trade in Sweeteners on the North American Free Trade Agreement
(Sept. 1992) (on file with New Mexico Law Review).
133. Ann M. Veneman, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, Testimony Before the Senate Finance
Comm. 10 (Sept. 30, 1992).
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Section 22 quotas, however, these industries chiefly are concerned with
strict enforcement of rules of origin to preserve the integrity of the
Section 22 quotas for non-NAFTA countries.1
3 4
III. OUTLOOK FOR INVESTMENT IN MEXICO'S
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
The most important factor driving inestment in and development of
Mexico's agriculture sector will be whether markets expand. Increased
sales to the growing Mexican market may be an important factor in
attracting foreign investment and expanding production. Direct investment
in Mexico by United States processors helped boost Mexican affiliate
export sales to $1.5 billion in 1991; however, Mexican affiliate sales
within Mexico were $4.1 billion, three times higher than exports. 135 Thus,
growing agricultural products for the Mexican market could be a key to
increasing investment in agriculture by foreign corporations.
As a result of recent reforms, a foreign company may now own up
to 100076 of the common stock of a Mexican agricultural company and
forty-nine percent of the Series T stock representing land ownership. This
may provide a strong incentive for vertical integration in Mexico's growing
food processing industry. However, it is not yet clear whether United
States investors will take advantage of opportunities to own agricultural
land in Mexico. Significantly, Mexico retains its prohibition on foreign
investment in "Restricted Zone" land (50 kilometers from the coast and
100 kilometers from the border). 3 6 Critical infrastructure and some of
the best horticultural production is located within the Restricted Zone
where direct foreign ownership is not permitted.'
3 7
Thus far, United States agribusinesses have expressed more interest in
contract farming and marketing arrangements than in land ownership.'3
Leasing or joint ventures provide broader opportunities for participation
in the means of production and less financial commitment and risk.
Foreign investors already may lease land in both the interior and the
Restricted Zone without limitation on amount. In addition, trust me-
chanisms exist to permit foreign investors beneficial use of land in the
Restricted Zone. 139
134. Letter from E. (Kika) de la Garza, Chairman, Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of
Representatives, to the Honorable Carla Hills, United States Trade Representative (June 23, 1992).
Tariffication of the Section 22 waiver would not be desirable in the bilateral (U.S.-Mexico) context.
Moreover, it could set an undesirable precedent for future bilateral or plulateral free trade negotiations
with other Latin American or Caribbean countries under the proposed Enterprise for the Americas
and could undermine the U.S. position in the Uruguay Round (UR).
135. Report of the Agricultural Technical Advisory Committee for Trade on the North American
Free Trade Agreement 3 (Sept. 1992) (on file with the New Mexico Law Review).
136. MEX. CoNsr. art. 27, 1 (affirmed in NAFTA, supra note 60, art. 1102 (Reservation to
National Treatment)).
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Potential foreign investors will likely balance the advantages of low-
cost labor and seasonality with the disadvantages of lower productivity
and lower yields.'40 Investors, however, may face higher than anticipated
costs due to substantial up-front costs in equipment and irrigation. Many
of the necessary materials must be imported and at this time are subject
to tariffs. Also, government elimination of subsidies for irrigation, elec-
tricity, fuel, and fertilizer could result in higher than anticipated costs.
Mexico's agricultural labor costs, however, will remain relatively low for
the foreseeable future. 14'
The Mexican Investment Board reports that some seventy joint venture
projects are currently underway, and that another thirty are under ne-
gotiation. These include the following:
" PepsiCo invested $44 million with Sahritass (a snack food producer)
in two new plants in 1991, in addition to PepsiCo's 1990 Vaquerias
project with Gamesa.
" Tyson entered into a joint venture with poultry processor Grupo
Trasgo and C. Itoh & Co. (Grupo Trasgo accounts for fourteen
percent of Mexico's poultry production and is currently expanding
operations with a $100 million investment. Itoh markets about fifty
percent of the processed chicken in Japan.) Tyson is providing
technology and technical assistance for a $60 million investment in
chicken production by ejido farmers.
" Tropicana has two projects totaling $14 million, one privately-owned
and one in partnership with farmers, to produce and market oranges.
Procigo, a Mexican firm, will process oranges into orange juice,
which Tropicana will market in Mexico and foreign markets.
* Green Giant has initiated a $16 million wholly-owned vertically
integrated vegetable processing and packaging facility in Guanajuato.
* Ralston-Purina, which has operated feed plants in Mexico for thirty-
five years, recently started a new feed plant at Monterrey and a
pet food plant near Mexico City. 142
While numerous joint venture projects are proceeding, many were
already planned and are being undertaken by companies with a long-
standing presence in Mexico. Agricultural investment new to Mexico
appears to be waiting until NAFTA is implemented and the resiliency
of recent reforms is proven. Mexico's investment liberalizations in the
agricultural sector are seen by many as being most beneficial to Mexican
agricultural investors at this time. 141
Increased foreign investment in Mexican agriculture, however, is a top
priority of the Salinas Administration. Mexico is seeking to make its
140. Tom Karst, Laying Out The Investment Welcome Mat, THE PACKER, Apr. 25, 1992, at 7A.
141. U.S.-Mexico Trade: Pulling Together or Pulling Apart?, at 15 (U.S. Congress Office of
Tech. Assessment 1992).
142. Mexico: Your Partner for Growth, at 10-15 (May, 1992) (Mexican Investment Board Pub-
lication; on file with the New Mexico Law Review).
143. Telephone conversation with Bobby Richie, USDA Foreign Agriculture Service Agriculture
Attache, Mexico City (Sept. 10, 1992).
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agricultural sector more attractive to investors and to prepare it for freer
trade under NAFTA. Through 1993, the government plans to unveil a
series of sub-sector market strategies that will include phase-out of gov-
ernment support for some products and increased support for others.
The agricultural ministry is expected to launch a program to improve
market infrastructure in the country. In addition, Mexico may lower
import tariffs on a variety of agricultural inputs and supplies. 1"
To provide support in the agriculture commercialization process, the
government of Mexico has created an entity called ASERCA. ASERCA's
role is to provide information on national and international prices, to
link buyers and sellers, to assist producers and distributors in obtaining
credit, and to assist in locating transportation and related services for
agro-industry 41 Also, Mexico will initiate a futures market in 1993 with
support from the Mexican stock exchange and the Chicago Board of
Trade.
The deregulation process in the agricultural sector may provide in-
vestment opportunities for foreign investors.'14 Private investment is being
sought where formerly there was extensive government involvement through
parastatals. Investment is being encouraged in research and development,
infrastructure, production, processing, transportation, storage, and mar-
keting. 147
IV. CONCLUSION
Mexico's land tenure and market reforms represent not only an im-
portant economic change in Mexico's agricultural sector, but also a critical
policy shift from "food security" to "food access," whether domestically
produced or imported. Politically, this represents a sea-change in Mexico's
agricultural policy. In Mexico, the production of corn is not only an
economic activity, but is also a cultural one that has strong roots in the
nation's political revolutionary history. Therefore, Mexico's agreement to
liberalize further its agricultural sector in NAFTA, particularly corn
production, is a bold economic and political move.
The Salinas Administration recognizes that nothing less than broad
agricultural reform is in order. In his November 1989 State of the Union
Address, President Salinas stated that "agricultural decline is the greatest
challenge to Mexico's modernization." Mexico's agricultural economy
employs over twenty percent of the nation's population but contributes
less than six percent to GDP. Therefore, Mexico's effort to liberalize its
agricultural sector has important implications for the success of Mexico's
overall liberalization efforts. The U.S.-Mexico agricultural agreement con-
144. J. COMMERCE, Sept. 13, 1992, at 6A.
145. Louis Tellez, Foreign Investment Opportunities in the Mexican Agricultural Sector, BusINEss
MExico (Jan-Feb. 1992).
146. U.S. International Trade Commission Publication 2275, at 3-13 (Apr. 1990).
147. Mexico: Your Partner For Growth, supra note 142, at 5.
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tained in NAFTA can be viewed as a vehicle to affirm past liberalizations,
to promote future reforms, and to inject necessary capitalization and
technology into Mexico's critical rural sector, possibly transforming it
over the next generation.
COMMENTS ON THE IMPACT OF NAFTA ON
AGRICULTURE IN MEXICO
EDUARDO ROBLES-ELIAS*
The execution of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"),I given the circumstances, will probably constitute a condition
necessary, but not a condition sufficient, for the growth of Mexican
agriculture at the expected rates. To give you an idea of the formidable
problems that the Mexican government has to tackle to achieve the growth
goal, I will list some of the things that the government must undertake
for the purpose of making the dream come true.
First, the government will have to spend huge amounts of money in
the construction of dams, on irrigation projects, and in the opening of
new cultivation lands. The resources available for that purpose are meager.
The government will probably experiment by concessioning some of those
improvements to private investors, nationals and foreign investors alike.
Second, Mexico will have to spend considerable amounts of money in
the improvement and construction of roads, especially those that connect
the producing areas with the marketing and consumption centers and
with the exporting outlets. This will probably not be too difficult for
the government to accomplish, in light of its experience in the conces-
sioning of roads to the private sector.
Third, the government will have to see to it that the cost of water be
lowered or at least maintained at its current level for a reasonable period.
Fourth, like it or not, the government will also have to see to it that
the cost of energy be at least frozen for a reasonable length of time so
that the agricultural sector can recover from the staggering inflation of
the last ten years, from the resulting decapitalization. This would situate
Mexican agriculture in a competitive position in the environment to be
brought about by NAFTA. Unfortunately, the cost of water and power
has become a major outlay in the overall overhead of the business.
Fifth, the government will have to see that the management of irrigation
districts be transferred to users, in order to end the centralized decision-
making process that severely hurt the farmers in the past. The government
must cut the red tape involved in the administration of water usage and
involve the farmers in a sustained and conscientious effort to conserve
as much of that valuable resource as possible. The process of transferring
the management of water to daily users is now on the way, and it has
yielded encouraging results as far as I have been able to investigate.
* Lizarraga, Robles, Savifion y Tapia, S.C., Hermosillo, Sonora; Chairman of Board of Trustees,
University of Hermosillo; Professor of Law, University of Sonora and Instituto Tecnologico de
Monterrey, 1974-1977; J.D., University of Sonora; LL.M., Harvard Law School; admitted to Mexican
bar (1971).
1. Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex.
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Sixth, the Banco de Mexico and the Federal Treasury will have to use
their regulatory power to cause the newly privatized banks to allocate
substantial funds to the financing of agriculture, and to lower the current
interest rates on loans to farmers so that they are comparable to the
rates paid by American and Canadian farmers.
The government will have to see to it that crop insurance becomes
reliable and effective. (Please note that I have not said more reliable
and more effective, because the farmers complain crop insurance is
absolutely unreliable and ineffective.)
Agriculture, as you know, means nothing to a national economy without
a rapid, well-integrated and cost-effective transportation system. Until
very recently, the transportation business was one of the most heavily
regulated and restricted areas of economic activity in- my country, sur-
passed only in those respects by the mining industry, the financial services
industry, and the energy industry.
In order to avoid a reverse subsidy by the Mexican government to the
American and Canadian growers, the Mexican government will have to
curb inflation to a one digit annual inflation rate, similar or comparable
to the rates of the United States and Canada. Mexican farmers will never
raise their heads above the land level if inflation is not abated. This is
an excruciating reality to which the government cannot lend deaf ears
and blind eyes.
Both the government and Mexicans alike will have to make a herculean
effort to fight soil erosion, the environmental degradation of soil and
water caused by urban conglomerates and industries all over the country,
and the desertification produced by different uses of rain forests by poor
peasants, who barely survive by growing corn, chile, and beans. We must
avoid the depletion of water reserves of rural communities to appease
what appears to be the never quenchable thirst of cities and industries.
The government will have to do something to foster sound, uncorrupt,
and fair labor relationships and practices between the landowners and
the unions to be formed by land workers. The government will also have
to accept the new reality that the land workers need to be organized
into labor unions if large-scale agribusiness is ever going to become a
reality in Mexico.
Last, but not least, the Mexican government must put a definitive end
to the "agrarian reform." '2 The Mexican Congress, as is well known,
repealed the federal law on agrarian reform about six months ago. This
repeal, of course, has brought considerable relief to Mexican landowners
and, in the short run, it will benefit them more than foreigners wishing
to invest in the agricultural business.
I am very sorry to say that the officers of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform are still active in the search for land to expropriate and redis-
2. The "agrarian reform" is a euphemistic name for the permanent program for the redistribution
of rural land inaugurated by the 1917 Constitution.
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tribute. This is still possible, however, because the new Agrarian Law
permits the continuance of proceedings started before the enactment of
the new law. Whereas theoretically the time will come when all the
proceedings initiated before the enactment of the new Agrarian Law will
be completed, the government must take steps for the dismantling of the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform, or at least for its reduction to a minimum.
As soon as possible, the government must complete the redistribution
proceedings and officially declare that fact, if it really wants to do away
with insecurity, instability, and unproductivity in the agriculture business.
It is obvious that these guidelines to modernize Mexican agriculture
will prove challenging, but they must be implemented if the government
really wants to make Mexican agriculture competitive.

COMMENTS ON NAFTA AND THE TRADE IN
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
JAMES F. SMITH*
Agricultural and international trade has been distinguished in the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariff and Trade ("GATT")1 as an undisciplined
area, one which really has not been subjected to trade rules or been
liberalized. Agriculture deals with very sensitive issues of food sufficiency.
Governments are intimately involved in agriculture; thus, politically, it
is one of the most, if not the most, intractable areas in international
trade. It has been the cause of the ongoing deadlock in the Uruguay
Round. The negotiators in the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA' ")2 were faced with those realities, and they were also faced
with a variety of trade barriers, including tariff and non-tariff barriers.
The non-tariff barriers include phytosanitary regulations on both sides,
import permit restrictions on the Mexican side, and quotas on the U.S.
side. What the negotiators essentially did was convert the non-tariff
barriers into tariffs ("tariffication"). They came up with the concept of
the tariff quota rate, meaning essentially that tariffs would be immediately
eliminated on approximately fifty percent of the products now traded,
and otherwise they would be phased out over a period from five to ten
to fifteen years. Within a certain quota (current trade flows) there would
be no tariffs; over that quota, a tariff would be set which would be
gradually phased out.
Let me give you my prediction on what is going to happen with
NAFTA. We have heard that NAFTA is the lawyers' full employment
act of the 1990s. I predict that most of the employment will be in
agriculture because most of the disputes in this Agreement are going to
be in the agricultural area. I say that for several reasons. Since 1947,
forty-five percent of all GATT disputes have been over agriculture, and
many of these over subsidies. There are no agreed upon rules on subsidies
in NAFTA. Domestic subsidies and export subsidies are subject only to
vague restraints. The negotiators deferred resolution of this problem to
* Professor, University of California at Davis; Editor, DERECHO CONSTITUCtONAL COMPARADO:
MEXco-EsTADos UNIDos (2 vols. U.N.A.M., 1990); Author, United States-Mexico Agricultural Trade,
23 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 431 (1990); Author (with M. Whitney), The Dispute Settlement Mechanism
of the NAFTA and Agriculture, 68 N.D. L. REv. 567 (1992); Author, Aspectos juridicos del GA TT
y del comercio exterior estado unidense, Estados Unidos, Cuadernos Semestrales, U.N.A.M. (1986);
Visiting Professor, Acatlan National Autonomous University (1986-87); Fulbright Scholar, Institute
of Legal Research, U.N.A.M. (1985-86) and Uruguay (1991); B.S., Arizona State University, Tempe;
J.D., University of California at Berkeley; admitted to bar of California (1968).
1. Apr. 10, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, reprinted in BAsic DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIoNAL ECONOMIC
LAW 3 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990) [hereinafter GAIT].
2. Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex. [hereinafter NAFTA].
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the Uruguay Round. But, given the lack of agreement over domestic and
export subsidies, we can expect continuing disputes in that area.
Until NAFTA, Mexico and the United States have not had a great
many disputes with respect to countervailing duties, subsidies, and dump-
ing in the agricultural area. The disputes have mostly been in the man-
ufacturing sector. Now that tariffication has occurred, however, and now
that those tariffs will be reduced, it seems inevitable that we will see an
increase in countervailing duty and anti-dumping disputes.
Another problem area involves emergency or safeguard measures. It
appears that the NAFTA negotiators felt that by making these emergency
provisions unilateral they would avoid disputes. This may be wishful
thinking. These are very highly politicized and sensitive areas.
Finally, the sanitary and phytosanitary measures have caused a great
many disputes between the United States and Mexico, and it seems likely
that these disputes will continue. They will be resolved in Chapter 20,
the overall institutional provision.
A. Chapter 20
For a trade agreement to be successful it must have effective dispute
settlement mechanisms, or at least mechanisms that will evolve towards
that end. The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement ("FTA")3 provides
for binding arbitration on safeguard disputes. Binding arbitration has
been totally eliminated in NAFTA. NAFTA has more emphasis on ne-
gotiated settlements.
Chapter 20 of NAFTA is more of a negotiation model; it is not a
rule adjudication model. The parties sit down, given their overall economic
relationship, and determine resolutions to issues based on non-binding
recommendations of "arbitral panels." It is important to remember what
makes arbitration or rule adjudication binding and what does not. Some-
thing is not binding if it is merely states the recommendations of an
arbitral panel. Such recommended decisions are not binding on the na-
tional courts, so they are indeed subject to negotiation. As a matter of
fact, Chapter 20 goes out of its way to make that point clear, by pointing
out that the recommendations of the arbitral panel go to the parties and
not even to the commission. This is political decisionmaking.
Compare this to GATT. What we have seen in GATT over the years
is a steady evolution from a negotiation to a rule adjudication model.
That was particularly true during the first four years of the Uruguay
Round. From 1986 to 1990, the GATT parties developed a number of
procedural reforms to strengthen the adjudicatory process. The Dunkel
Text4 codifies these and goes even further, creating automatic panel
establishments and a permanent appellate body with review powers and
3. Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., reprinted in BAsic DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONoMIc LAW
353 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990) [hereinafter FTA].
4. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, UR-91-0185, GATT Secretariat (Dec. 20, 1991).
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authorization of retaliatory implementation, unless there is a negative
consensus against implementation. These measures have not yet been
adopted by GATT yet, because the Uruguay Round is stalemated, but
apparently the United States, the European Community, and Japan have
gone along with that Dunkel Text on dispute settlement mechanism. If
the Uruguay Round gets back on track, we will have a model that would
be more attractive for really making this sort of thing work.
I will make one other comment about the Canadian Agreement. In
Canada, under the FTA, the first dispute that was resolved was over
the salmon and herring landing requirement. Essentially, the Canadians
believed that salmon and herring should be one hundred percent landed
in Canada and that it could not be exported to the United States. That
was found to be violative of GATT, which is incorporated by the FTA.
The arbitral panel was a panel of experts which offered a recommended
solution. The solution was basically resolved by the panel itself, which
eventually worked out and negotiated a solution whereby Canada could
continue to have their landing requirement, but only for seventy-five
percent. The interesting thing in terms of dispute settlement mechanism
is that the panel was made up of two trade experts, two fisheries experts,
and one lawyer. Under NAFTA, the only way to have experts on the
panel, and I am distinguishing this from the scientific review board that
is described in Chapter 20, would be to choose experts who are nationals
of the other party to the dispute. You could not choose your own experts
under the new formula. That would make the kind of negotiating solution
that we saw in the herring case more difficult.
B. Chapter 19
My other remarks have to do with unfair trade practices, namely anti-
dumping duties and countervailing duties. This has been a very contentious
area between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Trade experts from
both Canada and Mexico have complained bitterly about "administered
protection" (International Trade Commission and International Trade
Administration). They have argued that the imposition of countervailing
duties and anti-dumping duties was just a form of legalized protectionism.
The FTA would have never become a reality without the compromise
measure of a binational panel to resolve these disputes. Mexico, at least
informally through various writings of its representatives, made it very
clear that in NAFTA it wanted nothing less than what Canada had
achieved; namely, binational panels for unfair trade practices cases. Due
in large part to leaked preliminary drafts of NAFTA, it now appears
that the United States tried to eliminate binational panels from unfair
trade practices. But in the final version of NAFTA, Chapter 19 reappeared
word for word, except for the inclusion of the special committee pro-
vision, 5 just as it was negotiated with Canada. That is a very important
5. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1905.
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achievement for Mexico, because it, like Canada, had now obtained a
procedural exception to the administration of our unfair trade practice
laws.
I want to just give you one case example of how significant that is,
and to show how this thing plays itself out politically. This example is
the celebrated fresh chilled or frozen pork case. The United States pork
industry was very concerned about competition from the Canadian pork
industry, so it took the opportunity to file an action with the International
Trade Administration ("ITA"), arguing that subsidies to swine were also
subsidies to pork and should be countervailed. That was round one. The
pork industry lost. The ITA ruled against them and said "pork is not
swine." The National Pork Council, therefore, went to Congress and
said that it did not like that result and asked to please change the law.
in 1984, Congress complied, with the 1984 definition of upstream subsidies
to include swine in the legal definition of a subsidy. Canada then took
the United States to GATT on this question and won. The United States,
under the GATT rules as they then existed, then blocked implementation
of that panel decision. Then along came the FTA, and the issue was
again litigated. This time the United States Pork Council won on the
"upstream subsidy" point before the ITA, because the law had been
changed. The Pork Council also won the issue of "material injury" on
a split vote of the International Trade Commission. The case then went
before the Binational Panel. What the Panel did was very interesting.
On the one hand, it stated that it is supposed to apply domestic law
and that domestic law in the United States is superior to GATT, because
the later law in time prevails. Therefore, the Panel stated that the upstream
subsidy provision, although it may very well have been in violation of
GATT, was to be upheld. On the other hand, the Panel found that there
was no material injury, and there developed a vitriolic series of opinions.
In any event, Canada won. The Pork Council, however, filed an
extraordinary challenge. Three retired judges were convened to find out
whether there was not a gross departure from the norms of a fair
procedure, a fairly narrow standard. They had no problem in finding
no such departure and ruled in Canada's favor. The chilled pork case
demonstrates how a very well-heeled protectionist lobby won their battle
in Congress but lost the legal war.
Harmonization should be the goal of free trade agreements. That is
ultimately what is going to make it work, even if it is a long term
evolutionary process. Chapter 19 has now been amended to eliminate the
effort on the part of the parties to negotiate a new set of rules giving
a common definition to dumping and to subsidies, which have proven
to be the new tools of protection. While the abandonment of the goal
of harmonization is understandable given the apparent consensus that
Chapter 19 should be made permanent, the substitution of procedural
harmonization for substantive trade law harmonization may prove short
sighted. Again, harmonization of substantive forms and binding adju-
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dication are the best legal structures to assure that NAFTA will be the
blueprint for the successful economic integration envisioned by the draft-
ers.

DISCUSSION OF NAFTA AND AGRICULTURE
QUESTION: Do you agree with Mr. Pena's observation that the benefits
that the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")' might
provide to Mexican agriculture will require an end to the ejido program
and, more particularly, do you feel that it is an absolute necessity that
the ejidos be allowed to be sold to foreign investors?
ANSWER, Lic. Robles-Elias: The termination of the agrarian reform is
and will prove necessary for the competitiveness of Mexican agriculture
under NAFTA. There is no question about that. The ejido, however,
will survive for a while, but its role will gradually change. On the other
hand, I do not think that it is an absolute necessity that the ejidos be
allowed to be sold to foreign investors for Mexican agriculture to benefit
from NAFTA. The ejidatarios will joint venture their lands with foreign
entrepreneurs or enter into other kinds of associations with them, but
they will not be permitted, at least during the foreseeable future, to sell
their lands to foreign investors. The ejido might eventually disappear as
a form of land tenure, but this is not likely to happen in the near future.
We must bear in mind that the 1910 civil war, and the conditions that
brought it about, are still very sensitive issues in the Mexican historical
memory and in the minds of today's Mexicans.
QUESTION: Despite the NAFTA silence on subsidies, do the NAFTA
agriculture provisions resolve any problems in the GATT agriculture
policy?
ANSWER, Lic. Robles-Elias: No, absolutely not, it is a clear punt.
Domestic subsidies are not touched and there is little language about
export subsidies. If you are going to do an export subsidy against another
NAFTA partner, you have to give them some notice before you do it,
and then if you are going to do an export subsidy that will impact to
counteract another non-NAFTA importer in a NAFTA country, then you
are supposed to consult with the importing party to try and get them
to impose the trade restriction in order to obviate your sending in the
subsidized export. The short answer is "no," there is absolutely no
attempt to give discipline to liberalize agriculture with respect to subsidies.
I do not criticize the NAFTA negotiators for that; I think it is clear
that the problem is between the European Economic Community and
the United States, and that is what we are hoping will be resolved.
1. Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex.

